A major challenge in AFL pertains to how DCs select and bid for DOs. Existing methods are generally static, making them ill-suited for dynamic AFL markets. To address this issue, we propose the Reinforcement Learning-based Bidding Strategy for DCs in Auction-based Federated Learning (RLB-AFL). We incorporate historical states into a Deep Q-Network to capture sequential information critical for bidding decisions. To mitigate state space sparsity, where specific states rarely reoccur for each DC during auctions, we incorporate the Gaussian Mixture Model into RLB-AFL.

ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in designing algorithms for non-truthful mechanisms with ROI constraints. While prior work has addressed truthful auctions or non-truthful auctions with weaker benchmarks, this paper provides a significant improvement: We develop online bidding algorithms for repeated first-price auctions with ROI constraints, benchmarking against the optimal randomized strategy in hindsight. In the full feedback setting, where the maximum competing bid is observed, our algorithm achieves a near-optimal eO( T)regret bound, and in the bandit feedback setting (where the bidder only observes whether the bidder wins each auction), our algorithm attains eO(T3/4)regret bound.

Online advertising platforms use automated auctions to connect advertisers with potential customers, requiring effective bidding strategies to maximize profits. Accurate ad impact estimation requires considering three key factors: delayed and long-term effects, cumulative ad impacts such as reinforcement or fatigue, and customer heterogeneity. However, these effects are often not jointly addressed in previous studies. To capture these factors, we model ad bidding as a Contextual Markov Decision Process (CMDP) with delayed Poisson rewards. For efficient estimation, we propose a two-stage maximum likelihood estimator combined with data-splitting strategies, ensuring controlled estimation error based on the first-stage estimator's (in)accuracy. Building on this, we design a reinforcement learning algorithm to derive efficient personalized bidding strategies. This approach achieves a near-optimal regret bound of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(dH^2\sqrt{T})$, where $d$ is the contextual dimension, $H$ is the number of rounds, and $T$ is the number of customers. Our theoretical findings are validated by simulation experiments.

We study the price of anarchy of first-price auctions in the autobidding world, where bidders can be either utility maximizers (i.e., traditional bidders) or value maximizers (i.e., autobidders).

Automatic bidding has become one of the main options for advertisers to buy advertisement opportunities intheonline advertising market[Dolan, 2020]. Theprevalence ofautomatic bidding is partly driven by the fact that it significantly simplifies the interaction between the advertisers and theadvertisingplatform.

Automated negotiation has emerged as a critical area of research in multiagent systems, with applications spanning e-commerce, resource allocation, and autonomous decision-making. This paper presents ChargingBoul, a negotiating agent that competed in the 2022 Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC) and placed second in individual utility by an exceptionally narrow margin. ChargingBoul employs a lightweight yet effective strategy that balances concession and opponent modeling to achieve high negotiation outcomes. The agent classifies opponents based on bid patterns, dynamically adjusts its bidding strategy, and applies a concession policy in later negotiation stages to maximize utility while fostering agreements. We evaluate ChargingBoul's performance using competition results and subsequent studies that have utilized the agent in negotiation research. Our analysis highlights ChargingBoul's effectiveness across diverse opponent strategies and its contributions to advancing automated negotiation techniques. We also discuss potential enhancements, including more sophisticated opponent modeling and adaptive bidding heuristics, to improve its performance further.

In non-truthful auctions such as first-price and all-pay auctions, the independent strategic behaviors of bidders, with the corresponding Bayes-Nash equilibrium notion, are notoriously difficult to characterize and can cause undesirable outcomes. An alternative approach to achieve better outcomes in non-truthful auctions is to coordinate the bidders: let a mediator make incentive-compatible recommendations of correlated bidding strategies to the bidders, namely, implementing a Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE). The implementation of BCE, however, requires knowledge of the distributions of bidders' private valuations, which is often unavailable. We initiate the study of the sample complexity of learning Bayes correlated equilibria in non-truthful auctions. We prove that the set of strategic-form BCEs in a large class of non-truthful auctions, including first-price and all-pay auctions, can be learned with a polynomial number $\tilde O(\frac{n}{\varepsilon^2})$ of samples of bidders' values. This moderate number of samples demonstrates the statistical feasibility of learning to coordinate bidders. Our technique is a reduction to the problem of estimating bidders' expected utility from samples, combined with an analysis of the pseudo-dimension of the class of all monotone bidding strategies.

The E-commerce advertising platforms typically sell commercial traffic through either second-price auction (SPA) or first-price auction (FPA). SPA was historically prevalent due to its dominant strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) for bidders with quasi-linear utilities, especially when budgets are not a binding constraint, while FPA has gained more prominence for offering higher revenue potential to publishers and avoiding the possibility for discriminatory treatment in personalized reserve prices. Meanwhile, on the demand side, advertisers are increasingly adopting platform-wide marketing solutions akin to QuanZhanTui, shifting from spending budgets solely on commercial traffic to bidding on the entire traffic for the purpose of maximizing overall sales. For automated bidding systems, such a trend poses a critical challenge: determining optimal strategies across heterogeneous auction channels to fulfill diverse advertiser objectives, such as maximizing return (MaxReturn) or meeting target return on ad spend (TargetROAS). To overcome this challenge, this work makes two key contributions. First, we derive an efficient solution for optimal bidding under FPA channels, which takes into account the presence of organic traffic - traffic can be won for free. Second, we introduce a marginal cost alignment (MCA) strategy that provably secures bidding efficiency across heterogeneous auction mechanisms. To validate performance of our developed framework, we conduct comprehensive offline experiments on public datasets and large-scale online A/B testing, which demonstrate consistent improvements over existing methods.